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In response to Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005).
It is no secret that trials are a dwindling feature of the American
legal landscape. In state courts, both the absolute number of civil and
criminal trials and the percentage of civil and criminal cases resolved
1
by trial declined markedly in the past quarter century. The downward trends are even more pronounced in the federal system. In federal courts, the percentage of civil cases concluded by either a bench
2
or jury trial dropped from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002. Between
1980 and 2002, the federal criminal trial rate plummeted from 23% to
3
4.8%. Not only are both state and federal trendlines down, but the
number and percentage of civil and criminal cases that go to trial are
now so small that a cottage industry has arisen to study the “vanishing
4
trial.”
Professor Ronald Wright has opened a new subfield in the vanish†
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A study of thirteen states showed that felony jury trial rates decreased from 5% in
1976 to 2% in 2002. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts:
1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 765 (2004). The civil jury trial rate in
twenty-two states fell from 1.8% in 1976 to 0.6% in 2002. Id. at 768.
2
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706 (2004).
3
Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90, 91 fig.1 (2005).
4
The ABA Section of Litigation underwrote a study of the vanishing trial phenomenon that produced a collection of fascinating papers. For an overview, see Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). The topic has spawned other articles and symposia. See, e.g., John Lande, Introduction to Vanishing Trial Symposium, 2006
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ing trial genre by noticing and perceptively analyzing the curious fact
that the rate of acquittals in federal criminal cases has declined even
5
faster than the rate of guilty pleas has increased. In seeking explana6
tions for what he calls “the end of innocence,” Professor Wright looks
primarily to factors that can be quantified and included in a regression analysis. In what follows, I have little but admiration to offer for
his impressive quantitative work. Likewise, I concur with Professor
Wright’s conclusion that one significant factor driving down both federal trial and acquittal rates is the government’s use of the markedly
increased bargaining leverage afforded to prosecutors by the post1987 federal sentencing system consisting of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines interacting with various statutory mandatory minimum
7
penalties. Indeed, in Part I of this Response, I offer a bit of additional evidence to support that proposition.
That said, I am not entirely convinced that Professor Wright’s
proposed explanations for the disproportionate decline in federal acquittal rates capture the whole story. In Parts II and III of this Response, I suggest that acquittals may be vanishing in part because a
once-common courtroom denizen—the true trial lawyer—is becoming an endangered species, particularly in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.
Even where those exotic creatures still roam, the system they inhabit
provides ever-greater disincentives to trying the kind of cases in which
acquittal is a live possibility.
I conclude by wondering if the slow extinction of the federal
criminal trial lawyer may be having deleterious effects that extend beyond the declining frequency of federal criminal trials and acquittals.
I. THE POSITIVE CORRELATION BETWEEN USE OF PROSECUTORIAL
BARGAINING POWER AND PLEA RATE
Professor Wright’s conclusion that the increased prosecutorial influence over sentencing outcomes afforded by the U.S. Sentencing

5

See Wright, supra note 3, at 101-06 (providing compelling data in graphical
form).
6
Id. at 79.
7
Id. at 150-54 (arguing that the most effective reforms of sentencing laws should
be those that reduce prosecutorial power “to link sentence discounts to the defendant’s choice to plead guilty”). This conclusion is consistent with my own critiques of
the current operation of the federal sentencing system. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III,
The Failure of the Federal Sentencing System: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1315, 1336-40 (2005) (contending that prosecutorial power has increased due to the
complexity of the system).
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8

Guidelines and associated provisions has increased the rate of guilty
pleas is based on three interlocking premises:
(1) The Guidelines, mandatory minimum sentence statutes, and other
recent federal sentencing innovations significantly increased the nomi9
nally applicable sentence for many common federal crimes.
10
(2) The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Guidelines provided
prosecutors with an array of discretionary mechanisms to lower a defendant’s nominal sentence in return for a plea of guilty, an agreement to
11
cooperate, or both.
(3) Federal prosecutors use available sentence bargaining mechanisms
12
in ways and to degrees that vary between districts and over time.

All three premises are demonstrably true, but to prove empirically
that the increased bargaining leverage latent in the Guidelines’ structure has indeed affected plea rates, one must show that differences in
prosecutorial use of available mechanisms to reduce defendants’ sentencing exposure correlate with differences in plea rate, either horizontally, from district to district, or longitudinally, from year to year.
Professor Wright’s multivariate analysis finds positive correlations
between an increased plea rate and certain methods of reducing a defendant’s sentence as part of a plea bargain that are especially subject
to government influence—most notably, substantial assistance agreements and the three-offense-level discount for early pleas and accep13
tance of responsibility. He deduces from these and other correla8

Among the important “associated provisions” are the mandatory minimum sentences and other sentence-enhancing provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA)
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S. Code), and subsequent anti-drug legislation.
9
See Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing Reforms: An
Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 20-21, 29-30 (2001) (describing how
the original federal Sentencing Guidelines increased economic crime sentences above
historic norms, and how the 2001 amendments to the Guidelines increased penalties
for some classes of economic crime even further); see generally Frank O. Bowman, III &
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1059-63 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion] (describing congressional and U.S. Sentencing Commission actions that have
heightened drug penalties).
10
Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987.
11
See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV.
477, 525-30 (2002) [hereinafter Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II](discussing various
factors, including many within the discretionary authority of prosecutors, that affect
sentence outcomes).
12
Id. at 512-24 (describing various bargaining practices and the “departures” from
applicable guideline ranges that they yield).
13
According to Professor Wright,
Two of the most important tools used to increase the plea discount were “sub-
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tions that when prosecutors offer more sentence reductions as incen14
tives to plead guilty, the rate of guilty pleas is likely to rise.
I have some reservations about the notion, implicit in Professor
Wright’s results, that changes in prosecutorial substantial assistance
practice had a significant causal relation to the national increase in
guilty plea rates between 1994 and 2002. Had that been the case, one
would expect to find either that prosecutors made substantial assistance motions for an increasing percentage of defendants, or that the
size of the substantial assistance departures increased, or both. Yet, as
shown in Figure 1, nationally the proportion of defendants receiving
substantial assistance departures declined fairly steadily after 1996.
Likewise, Figure 1 also shows that between 1997 and 2002, the size of
substantial assistance departures as a percentage of the bottom of the
applicable guideline range also declined slightly, while departure size
expressed in number of months below the bottom of the applicable
guideline range edged up slightly. It is hard to see how a declining
percentage of substantial assistance motions of roughly stable size
would contribute to a progressive, system-wide increase in guilty pleas.

stantial assistance” departures that rewarded defendants with lighter sentences
for cooperating with the government to develop cases against other defendants, and “acceptance of responsibility” adjustments to lighten the sentences
of defendants who pled guilty early and gave the government full information
about their crimes.
Wright, supra note 3, at 85. Downward departures based on substantial assistance to
the government in the investigation or prosecution of another person are authorized
by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. III 2003) and U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5K1.1 (2006). Two-level and three-level adjustments for acceptance of responsibility
are authorized by U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2006). Award of the
third level is possible only if the government advises the court that the defendant has
provided full information about his own participation in the offense. Id.
14
Wright, supra note 3, at 132 & n.161 (“Defense attorneys grumble that prosecutors operating under the sentencing guidelines can make it virtually impossible to resist a guilty plea offer.”).
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Figure 1: Substantial Assistance Departure Rate & Size, 1994–2002
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I do not doubt that government substantial assistance practices influence defendant plea behavior, particularly in combination with
other factors included in Professor Wright’s analysis. I mention the
role of substantial assistance in that analysis primarily to emphasize
that the mechanisms available to the government for offering a lower
sentence as part of a plea bargain are numerous and are employed in
16
myriad combinations in different federal districts. Direct proof that
the exercise of prosecutorial bargaining leverage raises plea rates
would require correlating increases in the plea rate with increases in
the size of the aggregate plea discount produced by all of the various
mechanisms prosecutors employ—substantial assistance motions,
17
third level of acceptance, recommendations for role adjustments, the
18
“safety valve,” charge bargains, fact bargains, acquiescence in nonsubstantial assistance departures, etc. Unfortunately, the direct approach is probably impossible because there are no statistics on either
the frequency or magnitude of many commonly offered plea induce15

The data in Figure 1 is derived from Table 30 (size of substantial assistance departures), Figure C (national guilty plea rate), and Figure G (substantial assistance departure rates) of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1996–2002. The Commission did not publish data on the size of
substantial assistance departures prior to 1997.
16
See Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 588-91 (1998) (comparing the departure
rates in the Districts of Massachusetts and Connecticut, and showing an inverse relationship between the number of substantial assistance departures and the number of
nonsubstantial assistance departures); Ian Weinstein, Substantial Assistance and Sentence
Severity: Is There a Correlation?, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 83, 83-85 (1998) (describing study
results that show no correlation between substantial assistance rates in a district and
sentence length, and observing that different districts use different procedural tools to
negotiate pleas and manipulate sentence lengths).
17
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1–.2 (2006) (indicating aggravating and mitigating roles).
18
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2
(2006).
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ments. In light of that reality, one can only admire Professor Wright’s
study as a superb application of methodological rigor to necessarily
imperfect data that provides important evidence that prosecutorial
bargaining behavior has increased guilty plea rates.
His conclusion is consistent with other, cruder indicators. Several
years ago, Michael Heise and I examined the marked decline in the
length of federal drug sentences from 1991–2000, a decline that reversed the trend toward longer drug sentences that began with the
19
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. We concluded
that discretionary choices made by prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, and probation officers were largely responsible for the 1991–
20
2000 decline. Our empirical analysis suggested that prosecutors in
particular made increasing use of the tools given to them by statutes,
rules, and guidelines to offer ever more favorable sentencing outcomes to drug defendants. As drug sentence length fell during the
1990s, the percentage of guilty pleas steadily increased.
Events since 2000 reinforce the connection between prosecutorial
sentence-bargaining practices and plea rates in drug cases. By happenstance, the period of declining drug sentences Professor Heise
and I studied corresponded roughly to the tenure of the Clinton administration. In 2001, the Bush administration came into office, and
its appointees in the Justice Department consciously sought to tighten
plea bargaining standards, increase adherence to the Guidelines, and
21
reverse the downward trend in sentence severity. As Figure 2 below
illustrates, federal drug cases in the Guidelines era show a notable in22
verse correlation between guilty plea rate and sentence length. In
general, as sentence length gradually decreased throughout the Clin19

See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion, supra note 9, at 1063-66 (providing data
demonstrating the rise and fall of federal drug sentence lengths); Bowman & Heise,
Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 483-87 (same).
20
Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 554-55 (offering data to explain the impact of discretionary choices among actors of the judicial system).
21
See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to
All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (requiring federal prosecutors to charge and accept guilty pleas to nothing less than the “most serious, readily provable offense”
committed by the defendant).
22
The mean drug sentence lengths in Figure 2 are from the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1997-2004 ( Figure
E). The plea rates for drug cases in Figure 2 are from the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1997–2004 (Table 38) and
1996 (Table 38), and from the Commission’s Annual Reports from the years 1995
(Table 42), 1994 (Table 50), and 1993 (Table 55).
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ton 1990s, the percentage of cases resolved by plea increased. Conversely, after the Bush administration took office in 2001 and gained
solid control of the Justice Department, drug sentence length trended
23
markedly upwards, from an average of 71.7 months in 2001 to an av24
erage of 81.3 months during the portion of 2004 prior to the Blakely
25
v. Washington decision that cast the constitutionality of the Guidelines into doubt. And, as Professor Wright would surely have predicted, the proportion of drug cases resolved by plea dropped for the
26
27
first time in a decade, from 96.9% in 2001 to 95.2% in 2004. Although one should not place too much weight on apparent correlations between only two variables in a complex system, it is reasonable
to suppose that the increase in trial rate for drug cases from 2002 to
2004 was attributable at least in part to a decreased willingness on the
part of Bush Justice Department prosecutors to offer plea discounts as
large as those to which the defense bar had grown accustomed during
the Clinton administration.
Figure 2: Federal Drug Sentence Length Versus Guilty Plea Rate,
1993–2004
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U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATIS32 fig.E (2002) [hereinafter 2001 SOURCEBOOK].
24
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 50 fig.E (2005) [hereinafter 2004 SOURCEBOOK].
25
542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (finding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
prohibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences on the basis of facts other than
those decided by a jury or admitted by a defendant).
26
2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at 73 tbl.38.
27
2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 24, at 99 tbl.38.
TICS
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The hypothesis that prosecutorial plea bargaining policies materially affect sentence lengths and plea rates also receives anecdotal support from the experience of the Southern District of Florida, where I
served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) from 1989 to 1996.
When I joined the office, the United States Attorney was Dexter Lehtinen, a hard-driving Vietnam veteran determined that his office
would be the biggest, busiest, and toughest in the country. Once the
28
Guidelines were declared constitutional in 1989, U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh issued a memorandum requiring that
prosecutors not circumvent the Guidelines by bargaining around
29
them. U.S. Attorney Lehtinen resolved that in South Florida the
Thornburgh memorandum would be enforced to the letter, and he
policed that resolution rigorously. At the same time, he fostered an
office culture in which going to trial was encouraged and rewarded.
30
Between 1990 and 1992, when Lehtinen resigned, the average sentence in the district jumped by almost two years, from 81 months to
31
104.2 months. By 1992, 24% of all cases in the Southern District
32
33
went to trial, while the national trial rate was 13%. But, as Figure 3
34
illustrates, as soon as Lehtinen left, the average sentence began to
fall while the percentage of cases resolved by plea began to rise. Yet
perhaps because Lehtinen set the tone in the district at the outset of
the Guidelines era, the trial culture created by his dogged (some said
dogmatic and intransigent) adherence to the Guidelines persisted. It
would be a decade after his departure before the trial rate in the
35
Southern District of Florida fell to the national average.

28

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
RICHARD THORNBURGH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA POLICY FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS (1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G. REP. 347, 348 (1994) (“[B]argaining
must honestly reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and any
departure to which the prosecutor is agreeing, and must be accomplished through appropriate guideline provisions.”).
30
See Rebecca Wakefield, Lehtinen for Mayor, MIAMI NEW TIMES, May 22, 2003,
available at http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2003-05-22/news/lehtinen-for-mayor/.
31
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT app. B (1991) (S.D. Fla. data).
32
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT app. B (1993) (S.D. Fla. data).
33
Id. (national data).
34
The data in Figure 3 is derived from Appendix B of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Annual Report for the years 1989–1995, and from Appendix B of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics for the years 1996–
2004.
35
Dexter Lehtinen’s tenure as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida
was, for many reasons, controversial. In describing the effects of his policies on sentence lengths and trial rates, I express no view on any other aspect of that tenure.
29
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Figure 3: Southern District of Florida—Plea Rate and Average Sentence
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II. THE VANISHING TRIAL LAWYER
Professor Wright’s excellent study, my work with Professor Heise
on drug sentences, and my experience as a federal prosecutor convince me that there is a clear correlation between prosecutors’ use of
the added bargaining leverage afforded them in the Guidelines era
and the increased federal plea rate from 1994 to 2002. That said, Professor Wright’s work establishes prosecutorial bargaining behavior as
an important mechanism in producing a higher plea rate, but does not
answer the vexing question of prosecutorial motive for employing that
mechanism to continually shrink the number of federal trials year after year. Even though federal prosecutors can offer large sentencing
discounts to induce pleas, the percentage of pleas should increase
over time only if prosecutors choose to offer larger discounts every year.
They apparently did so, at least during the period from 1994 to 2002.
But why?
The most tempting explanation would be rising caseload pressure—i.e., a perception among prosecutors that unless the government was willing to “buy” convictions with ever-higher plea discounts,
the system would be overwhelmed, or at least they themselves would
be crushingly overworked. But AUSA caseloads remained essentially
36
unchanged during the 1990s. Moreover, Professor Wright’s multi-

36

See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 557 (reporting that
from 1992 to 1999, AUSAs’ criminal caseload stayed roughly static, fluctuating between
nine and twelve cases per Assistant per year).
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variate analysis found that “prosecutors’ caseloads in a district did not
37
affect either the guilty plea or acquittal rate.” And my own experience as both a federal and state prosecutor tells me that, with the possible exception of some of the Mexican border districts, federal prosecutors have very modest caseloads relative to state prosecutors, and
certainly do not face the kind of caseload pressure that would force a
perennial choice between rising plea discounts or an unmanageable
38
federal criminal docket.
If heavier caseloads cannot explain higher plea rates, what can?
In our study of the causes of declining federal drug sentences in the
1990s, Professor Heise and I surmised that front-line federal sentencing actors—judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and probation officers—exercised their discretion in ways that progressively lowered
drug sentences because many of them believed that “drug sentences
are often, though not always, either too long as a matter of equity or
longer than necessary to achieve the personal or institutional objec39
tives of the decision-makers.” But we never supposed prosecutors
were actively seeking to use their sentence bargaining power to lower
average drug sentences; we hypothesized only that drug sentences
were high enough to render prosecutors pliable in their interactions
with others in the system who were actively seeking reduced sentences
through negotiated pleas. Pliability is hardly the same thing as aggressively wielding prosecutorial power to induce pleas and discourage tri40
als.
In truth, I know of no entirely satisfactory explanation for the federal system’s increasing affinity for negotiated pleas rather than trials.
I strongly suspect that part of the answer lies in changing institutional
values in the judiciary and the Justice Department. In my professional
lifetime, efficient case management has become a matter of evergreater consequence to federal judges. Busy judges in any era have a
natural bias in favor of bargained resolutions over time-consuming

37

Wright, supra note 3, at 149.
My personal practice experience is consistent with available statistics. See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion II, supra note 11, at 556 (revealing that, in the past, state
prosecutors have carried caseloads up to thirteen times greater than those of AUSAs).
39
Id.
40
In any event, drug cases make up only 40.5% of the federal criminal docket, and
plea negotiation practices in that class of cases alone could hardly account for the
steady rise of pleas across the federal board. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 11 fig.A (2003) [hereinafter 2002 SOURCEBOOK].
38
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trials, but that bias is palpably stronger in modern federal district
41
courts.
Similarly, the Justice Department has become more attuned to
“outputs,” pressing U.S. Attorneys for measurable results in terms of
numbers of cases processed, either to trumpet the success of an administration crime initiative, or to demonstrate tangible results in
crime types that have become the focus of congressional interest.
This shift to volume-based measures of success and the concomitant
emphasis on efficient case processing have even altered the Justice
Department’s traditional attitude toward the law itself. For example,
in the past four or five years, the Department has begun arguing for
enhanced guideline or statutory sentences, not because the enhancements are inherently just or required for adequate deterrence, but
precisely because higher sentences provide increased plea bargaining
42
leverage.
A comprehensive explanation of the vanishing federal criminal
trial is unlikely to be found among factors particular to the federal
criminal system. Trial rates, state and federal, civil and criminal, are
plunging together. Even adversary proceedings in federal bankruptcy
43
court are declining steadily. But regardless of the first causes for the
trend to ever-fewer federal criminal trials, I would suggest that the antitrial culture has become so pervasive and the number of trials so
small that the federal system may have passed a tipping point at which
the declining number of trials has itself become a self-reinforcing
cause of further declines. Which brings us to the phenomenon of the
41

See, for example, the 2003 testimony of the chief judges of the Southern and
Central Districts of California before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in which both
advocated for the creation of a Guidelines “fast track” provision, permitting enhanced
plea discounts for defendants who plead guilty particularly early in districts with very
high caseloads. Implementing Requirements of the PROTECT Act: Hearing of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/
9_23_03.htm.
42
See Defending America’s Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 4547 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Catherine M. O’Neil, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen.) (arguing in support of increased
mandatory minimum sentences in some drug cases, because the threat of longer sentences allows the government to move “effectively up the chain of supply using lesser
distributors to prosecute larger dealers, leaders and suppliers”); Sue Reisinger, Government Seeks Tougher Sentences, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A20 (quoting a senior Justice Department official as arguing for across-the-board economic crime sentence increases to provide leverage to secure cooperation from smaller-time defendants).
43
See Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 913, 922-37 (2004) (noting and analyzing the decline in adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy system).
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vanishing federal criminal trial lawyer.
The public image and self-conception of federal prosecutors is of
a select cadre of veteran trial lawyers. Yet current statistics belie the
image and suggest that the lives of federal prosecutors increasingly resemble the “litigators” of civil practice who spend their lives processing cases, but never actually trying them. The numbers are striking.
44
45
In 2002, there were 5,304 AUSAs, but fewer than 2,000 trials. Even
making the generous assumption that every trial was staffed by two or
more AUSAs, fewer than four out of five AUSAs had so much as a single trial in 2002. Over time, numbers this low mean that the average
46
AUSA will go to trial less than once a year. The situation in many
districts is even starker. In 2002, thirty-one out of the ninety-four fed47
eral districts saw fewer than ten trials. The two districts covering the
48
state of Wisconsin boasted eleven trials between them. Vermont re49
ported zero trials in 2002 and only two in 2001.
In an environment like this, over time U.S. Attorneys’ Offices will
contain fewer and fewer real trial lawyers—those with the skills, judgment, and self-confidence born only of long courtroom experience.
Becoming a real trial lawyer takes years of practice and constant exposure to the cut-and-thrust of many trials. Once the skills are acquired,
they have to be used to be maintained. With trial rates at their current nadir, lawyers who come to a U.S. Attorney’s Office with no trial
experience won’t get any. Those who had some can’t hone it. Those
who once had lots are losing their edge.
In an office where trials are frequent and valued for their own
sake, winning and losing matters less than a willingness to accept battle. But as the number of trials decreases, the attention each trial receives within the office increases, as does the potential professional
risk to any lawyer involved. In an office staffed mostly with trial novices and out-of-practice veterans, rare trials loom as daunting events,

44

Wright, supra note 3, at 120 n.116.
2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 40, at app. B (national Data).
46
The precise ratio of criminal trials to federal prosecutors is difficult to calculate.
A fraction, perhaps one-fifth, of AUSAs are assigned wholly or partially to civil work, a
fact that increases the average number of cases tried by criminal AUSAs. However,
some (small) fraction of federal criminal trials are not handled by AUSAs, but by trial
lawyers from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice in Washington, a fact
that reduces the average number of trials per criminal AUSA.
47
2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 40, at app. B.
48
Id. (Wisconsin data).
49
Id. (Vermont data); 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 23, at app. B (Vermont data).
45
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pregnant with the potential for embarrassment and failure. I think it
likely that lawyers in such an office will shy away from trial, even in
cases that ought to be tried, preferring the less risky and now institutionally ordinary practice of buying a plea with a little extra sentencing concession. And the fewer cases an office tries, the higher the
50
psychological barriers become.
The suggestion that low trial rates have become their own cause
receives some support from the experience of the last six years. As
noted above, beginning in 2001, as the Bush Justice Department
tightened plea bargaining policies, sentence lengths rose (presumably
as a result of reduced plea discounts) and plea rates fell. Yet the decline was very modest—from 97.1% in 2002 to 95.5% in the pre-Blakely
51
portion of fiscal year 2004. If plea rates were really as “price sensitive” as Professor Wright’s findings about prosecutorial influence imply, one might have expected a bigger effect. Perhaps more revealingly, in the three years since Blakely was decided in June 2004—a
period in which prosecutorial control over sentencing outcomes has
at least been relaxed, though hardly relinquished—the plea rate has
hardly varied at all. Indeed in 2006, the year after United States v.
52
Booker declared the Guidelines “advisory,” both the plea rate and the
53
average federal sentence were higher than before Blakely. In the face
of all the Blakely-Booker turmoil, something seems to have kept the notrial culture of the federal courts remarkably stable.
III. THE RISING ACQUITTAL RATE
Which brings me to the puzzling phenomenon of the disproportionately declining federal acquittal rate. Intuitively, one would think
that, as trials are squeezed out of the criminal system, the remainder
would disproportionately be cases in which defendants knew them50

I hasten to add that the Department of Justice is still home to many of the best
trial lawyers in America. But I think it idle to deny that the culture of U.S. Attorneys’
Offices has tilted steadily away from the trial lawyer ethos.
51
Compare 2002 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 40, at 21 tbl.10, with 2004 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 24, at 41 tbl.10.
52
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“The district courts, while
not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into
account when sentencing.”).
53
In 2006, the plea rate was 95.7%, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK
OF FED. SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.10 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 SOURCEBOOK], compared with 95.5% in the pre-Blakely portion of fiscal year 2004, 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 24, at 41 tbl.10, while the average (mean) federal sentence was 51.8 months in
2006, 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at tbl.13, and 50.1 months in the pre-Blakely portion of
fiscal year 2004, 2004 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 24, at tbl.13.
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selves to be wrongly accused and thus insisted on a chance at vindication, or at least those in which their lawyers felt the chance of success
at trial to be high enough to forego the offered plea discount. Yet the
reverse seems to be happening.
Professor Wright attributes the disproportionate decline of acquittals to many of the same factors that caused the decline of trials, in
particular the exercise of enhanced prosecutorial bargaining power in
54
the sentencing guidelines age. I confess that I am not entirely convinced. At the least his account lacks a fully convincing explanation of
why and how prosecutorial power is being used to induce a disproportionate fraction of defendants with strong, triable cases to plead guilty.
Which is not to say that I have a better explanation. My only tentative
suggestion is that part of the explanation may lie in the phenomenon
of the vanishing federal trial lawyer.
I suspect that one consequence of vanishing trials and trial lawyers
is an ever-rising incentive to ensure that one wins those cases that do
go to trial. A prosecutor’s office staffed with experienced trial lawyers
and institutionally committed to trying cases should not only try more
cases, but should be willing to go to trial in tougher cases—cases with
less-than-overwhelming odds of success, or cases somewhat more likely
to produce an acquittal. Conversely, given the immense prosecutorial
bargaining leverage Professor Wright correctly describes, prosecutors
made cautious by inexperience and office culture may be especially
likely to make risky cases go away, leaving little but “slam dunks” for
trial. Moreover, I wonder if the decline in federal trials has had a
similar effect on the defense bar—depriving defense attorneys of experience, creating a culture of accommodation and a generation of
defense counsel readier than its predecessors to convince clients to
accept pleas in triable cases. In short, I suspect the disproportionate
decline of acquittals may be a predictable outcome of the decline of
the trial lawyer among prosecutors and defenders alike.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Professor Wright suggests that trials and acquittals could be increased by reforming current sentencing arrangements to give prose55
cutors less control over sentencing outcomes. He may be right, but I
54

See Wright, supra note 3, at 116-17.
See id. at 151 (“[T]he most important target in reforming sentencing law should
be rules that currently give prosecutors monopoly power to link sentence discounts to
the defendant’s choice to plead guilty.”).
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fear that the degradation of federal trial culture has progressed so far
that not even a return to the days of unfettered judicial sentencing
discretion would do much to reverse the trend.
On a broader and concededly more speculative note, I fear that
the gradual disappearance of the federal trial lawyer has ill effects beyond trial and acquittal rates. Those who know and relish trials are
not afraid of them. They like a fair forensic fight. They believe a defendant ought to have his day in court if he wants it. They understand
that there is usually something to be said on both sides of any case and
that judging human behavior inevitably involves shades of grey. They
tend to be confident that the ordinary citizens who make up juries,
while not perfect factfinders, generally sort things out pretty well.
Perhaps for these reasons, trial lawyers are disposed to trust ordinary
criminal processes to deal with even extraordinary cases.
Trial lawyers have faith that truth must be sought and justice done
without official brutality or oppression. But they have the realist’s understanding that the cost of foregoing police-state methods, the cost
of preserving the liberties enshrined in the Constitution, is some
tragedies unprevented and some crimes unpunished. And, although I
may be too sanguine, a long career among them suggests that trial
lawyers are less inclined than those who have never addressed a jury to
view criminal justice through a political lens. Rather, they tend to
view themselves as apolitical inheritors of an Anglo-American tradition
of adversarial justice that has value independent of partisan interests.
People who see the world this way have been in perilously short
supply in the higher counsels of American government in recent
years. As their number dwindles, so too does the number of defenders of the values of adversarial fair play essential to the American idea
of justice. In the long run, the extinction of those values would be the
greatest tragedy of all.
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